Privileges to Protect the Government by Webb, Robert W.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 46 




Privileges to Protect the Government 
Robert W. Webb 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert W. Webb, Privileges to Protect the Government , 46 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 87 (1969). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol46/iss1/8 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
PRIVILEGES TO PROTECT THE GOVERNMENT
The second area of privileged communications concerns privileges which
exist to protect some government interest. This area will include the privi-
lege of an executive officer, recognized privileges which the government may
claim, housekeeping privileges and the required report privilege.
THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Some persons feel that an executive officer by authority of his office may
claim that his communications are privileged and beyond the reach of judi-
cial inquiry. The privilege is claimed to be a matter of necessity so that an
executive officer may receive and give advice necessary to execute the func-
tions of his office. Free exchange of ideas would be stifled if each idea was
subject either to public criticism or to the scrutiny of a coordinate branch
of government.' This privilege has been invoked against congressional
inquiry on many occasions.
2
The executive privilege was first invoked to avoid judicial inquiry in
the case of United States v. Burr.3 The President and other officers refused
to respond to subpoenas which commanded their appearance to give testi-
mony. The court took the position that the persons who composed the
executive branch of government were not above judicial inquiry, and like
other persons could be compelled to appear in court.4 However, the sub-
poenas were never enforced when the information desired was made avail-
able in documentary form. Thus, the power of the court over executive
officers was not determined in that case, and the issue still remains unsettled.
1 Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66
Yale L.J. 477 (1957). But see 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2730 & 2371 (McNaughton rev. 1961)
and Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166
(1958).
2 Bishop, supra note I.
3 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (No. 14694) (C.C.D.
Va. 1807).
4 Wigmore does not believe that an executive privilege exists. He believes that exec-
utive officers are only excused from attending trial if attendance would interfere with their
official duties. 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2370 & 2371 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Wigmore's
analysis may be historically correct because Jefferson never said the executive branch of
government need not supply information. President Jefferson's letter answered the Court
by saying he could not respond to the subpoena because his attendance would leave the
government without an executive branch. The trial of Aaron Burr (Coombs ed. 1864). But
Wignore's analysis is not accepted by the present executive officials. In 1958, 5 U.S.C.
§ 22 was amended for the espoused purpose of preventing administrative bodies from
withholding information from the public. President Eisenhower signed the act but said,
It is also clear from the legislative history of the bill that it is not intended to, and
indeed could not, alter the existing power of the head of an Executive department
to keep appropriate information or papers confidential in the public interest. This
power in the executive branch is inherent under the Constitution.
White House Press Release, August 12, 1958; Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, p. 601.
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The question of whether an executive privilege exists was considered
recently by the United States Supreme Court in United States ex. rel. Touhy
v. Ragen5 and United States v. Reynolds.6 In the Ragen case an F.B.I. agent
was held in contempt of court for refusing to produce records requested by
the trial court. The agent was obeying a department rule promulgated by
the United States Attorney General pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 22. The peti-
tioner argued that the court and not the head of a department should decide
the admissability of evidence. After finding the department rule was valid,
the court decided the case by saying a subordinate officer could not be held in
contempt for obeying a lawful command of the Attorney General. The
court found it unnecessary to decide what action could be taken against the
Attorney General because he was not a party to the case. 7
The Reynolds case was a suit brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for the death of civilian technicians killed in the crash of a military
test plane. The Secretary of the Air Force refused to furnish accident
reports which had been subpoenaed. The secretary claimed the executive
department had inherent power under the doctrine of separation of powers
to remove information from judicial inquiry.8 The case was decided in favor
of the government because the court found the information was protected
by the state secret privilege. The Court gave only passing recognition to the
claim of executive privilege by saying it was unnecessary to answer this
delicate constitutional question.
On two occasions, the privilege was asserted by state governors. In
Appeal of Hartranft,9 a Pennsylvania court recognized the privilege as a
necessity to the separation of powers doctrine. On the other hand a New
Jersey court in Thompson v. German Valley R.R.o took the position ex-
pressed in United States v. Burr." Although the opinion of the Thompson
case is cited as authority for the theory that no executive privilege exists, 12
the decision of the case shows the court had no intention of carrying its
theory into practice. First, the court said the governor could withhold any
paper or document if he decided his official duties so required. Second,
5 340 U.S. 462, 71 S. Ct. 416 (1951).
6 345 U.S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 528 (1953).
7 Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion said, . In joining with the
court's opinion I assume . . . the Attorney General can be reached by legal process."
340 U.S. at 472.
8 The trial court and the federal appellate court 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951) refused
to recognize the privilege granted by Congress in 5 U.S.C. § 22. When the case was taken
by the Supreme Court, the executive department made it clear that it was exercising its
inherent power which is protected in a constitutional system of separation of powers and
was not relying on the statute. (See note 9 Majority opinion.)
9 85 Pa. 433 (1877). See Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 391 (1953).
10 22 N.J. Eq. 111 (Ch. 1871).
11 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (No. 14692d) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (No. 14694) (C.C.D.
Va. 1807)
12 City of Buffalo v. Hanna Furnace Corp., 305 N.Y. 369, 113 N.E.2d 520 (1953); 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
official duties may be an excuse for not appearing in some circumstances. And
third, it would not entertain proceedings to hold the governor in contempt
because such action would only cause conflict between coordinate branches
of government.
Although the practical result of both cases may be the same, the dichot-
omy of ideas expressed in these initial cases explains the tenor of later
decisions where subordinate executive officers have made a claim of exec-
utive privilege. In Pennsylvania, the effect is shown in the case of In Re
Marks.13 The court agreed that the department of health is a branch of the
executive authority and its officers are able to claim the right not to disclose
information in their possession. Later decisions in New Jersey all but admit
that an executive privilege exists for executive officers of the same status as
the courts and legislature.14 However, these decisions carefully limit the
scope of the privilege as a requirement of the separation of powers doctrine.
By this doctrine there must be a claim by a coordinate branch of govern-
ment not just an executive officer or part of the executive authority.1 5 In the
case of State v. Cooper,16 New Jersey court rejected a lower court finding
that a report made by a police investigating bureau "has sort of a privilege."
The court said there is no privilege which puts evidence in the possession of
police beyond the reach of competent process. And in Eggers v. Kenny17 a
city commissioner could not claim an executive privilege against a legislative
investigation because a city official does not have the same status as the state
legislature. The privilege was further limited by Morss v. Forbes'8 which
held that a local prosecutor could not claim the executive privilege against
legislative inquiry where he could not show the subject under inquiry had
any connection with the governor or attorney general. The office of prosecu-
tor, although a constitutional office, is more appropriately part of local
government and is not "equal in stature" with the legislature.
If an analogy can be drawn between judicial attitudes on the executive
privilege and those police records which are not made public records by
some statute or ordinance, then Illinois is likely to recognize a claim of
executive privilege. 19 In Illinois, with one exception, interdepartmental
13 121 Pa. Super 181, 183 A. 432 (Super. Ct. 1936).
14 Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957); Eggers v. Kenny, 15 N.J. 107, 104
A.2d 10 (1954).
15 Accord, La Guardia v. Smith, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153 (1942). The Mayor of New
York is not immune from the subpoena power of the city Council under the separation
of powers doctrine. The office of mayor is not a separate and coordinate branch of govern-
ment from the city Council. This is true, even though the mayor is called "the chief exec-
utive officer of the city" and the Council is "the local legislative body." The duties of
each branch are not exclusive and frequently overlap. Generally, coordinate and indepen-
dent branches of government are peculiar to state and federal governments.
16 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298 (1949).
17 Supra note 14.
18 Supra note 14.
19 The writer makes no claim that judicial treatment of confidential police records
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police reports are absolutely privileged regardless of the information they
contain. 20 The courts do not prevent disclosure only where the public inter-
est would be prejudiced if the information contained in the reports was
revealed. If the courts will recognize a claim of privilege to protect commu-
nications within the police departments, then there is no reason why they
should not recognize a claim of privilege for the other branches of govern-
ment. And the judicial consideration given to a claim of privilege should
correspond to the status of the officer making the claim.
RECOGNIZED PRIVILEGES
The government has two clearly recognized privileges. These are the
informer's privilege and the state secret privilege. What is referred to as the
informer's privilege is in reality the government's privilege.21 The purpose
is precedent for a case involving a claim of executive privilege. It is only suggested that
the attitudes within a state seem to remain consistent where comparable privileges are
asserted. The judicial attitudes of New Jersey and Pennsylvania have been fairly consistent
when confronted with a claim of privilege by a government official. There are other
examples of consistency in the treatment of claims by government officials who claim in-
formation or records should be kept confidential. To illustrate this point, in La Guardia
v. Smith, supra note 14, a New York court rejected a claim of privilege by a mayor
to prevent the disclosure of a report. Later in Scott v. County of Nassau, 23 Misc. 2d 648,
252 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1964) the court rejected a claim of privilege that a police report
was an "official confidential record" and protected by a County Government Law. The
court said such a claim was contrary to the policy of the state. Another example is State
ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965). Mandamus proceedings
were brought against a mayor to compel the inspection of an investigative report for al-
leged misconduct in the police department. The court said unless the mayor could show
specifically, in camera, how the public interest could be harmed, disclosure would be
compelled. In Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967), the petitioner
wanted to inspect confidential police reports. And the court said the Youmans case was
controlling.
To be sure, the courts can enforce their decision where a coordinate branch of govern-
ment is not asserting a claim. So a claim of privilege need not be recognized as a matter
of practical necessity. In In re Frank W. Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953), the
chief of police was the subject of Habeas Corpus proceedings. He was arrested by the
sheriff for refusing to produce police department records. If the Illinois courts will pro-
tect confidential police records, there is at least some indication they would accept other
claims of privilege.
20 Illinois grants almost complete protection to police reports. As a matter of public
policy and a possible requirement because of the decision in Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 669, 77 S. Ct. 1007 (1959), the courts have recently said disclosure of police reports is
required where contents could be used to impeach a state's witness. In Illinois, police re-
ports are absolutely privileged regardless of the information they contain unless disclosure
is necessary for impeachment purposes. People v. Mosses, 11 I11. 2d 84, 141 N.E.2d 1 (1957)
(interdepartmental records are not public records which are subject to subpoena. But the
accused now has the right to the production of documents which are contrary to the
testimony of the state's witnesses). People v. Wolff, 19 Ill. 2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960)
(defendant has a right to see every statement made to the police by any witness who
testifies). People v. Ostrand, 35 Ill. 2d 520, 221 N.E.2d 499 (1966); People v. Bailey, 56 Ill.
App. 2d 261, 205 N.E.2d 756 (1965) (police reports not available merely to obtain in-
formation); People v. Turner, 29 Ill. 2d 379, 194 N.E.2d 349 (1963) (police report given
to superior officer is not available except to impeach the testimony of an officer).
21 Roviaro v. United States, 350 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623 (1957).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
is to encourage citizens to perform their obligation to communicate knowl-
edge of criminal acts 22 to further and protect the public's interest in effective
law enforcement.2 3 The purpose of the informer's privilege is couched in
language of good citizenship, but when the privilege is applicable, commu-
nications are absolutely privileged regardless of motive, intent or probable
cause.
24
The informer privilege is usually invoked in a criminal proceeding, but
occasionally the privilege is asserted in civil proceedings. In actions between
private litigants, the court may not compel or allow a party to disclose what
information he has related to a proper governmental official. The same rule
applies to the subordinate officers who received the information. The parties
are unable to waive the privilege of confidence because the privilege exists
for the benefit of the government and only the government may waive it.25
The informer privilege may belong to the government, but the privilege
is clearly to protect the identity and well being of the informer. The under-
lying reason for the privilege limits its application. It is not the information
that is protected. Where the government is a party to the action, the govern-
ment may not withhold information if the information will not reveal the
identity of the informer or if the identity of the informer has been dis-
closed.2
8
The informer privilege is founded on public policy, but it is equally
true that public policy may require disclosure to uphold the fundamental
requirement of fairness. The trial court must decide if the identity of the
informer is relevant or helpful to the defense of the accused. For example,
the privilege must give way if the identity of the informer is necessary for a
fair trial. The government must make its choice to reveal the informant's
identity or to dismiss the action.2 7 But the courts have said identity is only
a necessary incident to a determination of guilt or innocence. At a prelim-
inary hearing to determine probable cause, the identity of an informer
22 Statements made to a state's attorney or other government prosecutors may not be
privileged. For example, statements given to a prosecutor to file a complaint are not priv-
ileged. The complaint is a public record and the informer privilege which protects the
identity of the informant has no justification. For other examples see 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§§ 2374 & 2375 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
23 Roviaro v. United States, supra note 21; In re Quarles, 158 US. 532, 15 S. Ct. 959
(1895); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 4 S. Ct. 12 (1884); Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d
390 (3d Cir. 1932) (good historical analysis). See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
24 Vogel v. Gruaz, supra note 23; 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
25 Id.; Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872); Dawkins v. Rokevy, L.R. 8 Q.B.
255 R. 7 H.L. 744 (1873).
26 Roviaro v. United States, supra note 21; Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627
(9th Cir. 1947) (accused knew the identity of the informer); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374
(McNaughton rev. 1961); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262 (1961).
27 Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (1955) (the person believed to be the in-
formant had a grudge against the defendant); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262 (1961).
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need not be disclosed. The police may testify to the reliability of an informer
to establish probable cause.28 Even if the police can not establish the infor-
mation came from a "reliable informer," probable cause can be established
without disclosing the identity of the informer if the police can show the
informant's information was corroborated.n
The state secret privilege can be claimed by the government where the
disclosure of information would impair the strength or security of the gov-
ernment. This privilege is often confused with the executive privilege be-
cause the state secret privilege is usually invoked by an executive officer.30
Also, what is often a claim of executive privilege is more often a claim that
public interest can only be protected by non-disclosure of security informa-
tion. If the court is satisfied that a secret of state is involved, the information
is absolutely privileged and cannot be used by private parties in a civil suit
even though the government is not a party.31
Secrets of states are primarily a concern of the federal government, but
there is no reason why a state cannot claim this privilege in matters of
internal security. The legislature has recognized that certain state militia
records should be made available only through the governor or his staff.32
This is probably a limited recognition of the state secret privilege. The full
scope of this privilege is hard to predict. At the state level and below, the
state secret is seldom mentioned by name. A claim of privilege is usually
phrased in terms of the public interest. Although a city could possibly sup-
port a claim that certain police, security or emergency information should
be privileged to protect internal security, such restricted reasons are prob-
ably unnecessary. 33
28 McCray v. State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S. Ct. 1056 (1967); People v. Williams,
38 Ill. 2d 150, 230 N.E.2d 214 (1967). See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 (McNaughton rev.
1961); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262 (1961); Identity of Informer Need Not Be Disclosed To
Establish Reasonable Cause for Arrest, 1963 Law Forum 739.
29 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959).
30 Carrow, Governmental Nondisclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev.
166 (1958).
31 In United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 528 (1953), the court said that
the most compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is satis-
fied military secrets are at stake. Disclosure cannot be required to determine if the sub-
ject matter is privileged. The court can only look at the circumstances surrounding the
claim of privilege and decide if confidential information could be involved. The inquiry
can proceed no further. Accord, Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) (no suit can
be brought which may disclose secrets of state); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 199 F. 353 (ED. Pa. 1912) (government could expunge testimony on matters em-
bodying secrets of military value in a patent infringement suit). See 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2378 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 391 (1953).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 129, § 220.92 (1967). But Professor Wigmore feels secrets of state
should not be privileged if only the internal affairs of public business are involved. 8 Wig-
more, Evidence § 2378 nn.6 & 7 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
33 The meaning of state secret has become more a claim that the public interest
would be adversely affected if disclosure were compelled. For example in State ex rel.
Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965), the court said it would accept
a showing that the public interest would be harmed as a defense to disclosing a report.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
HOUSEKEEPING STATUTES
Some information which the government possesses is not within the
informer or state secret privileges, but for various reasons the government
feels full disclosure is undesirable. Statutes which restrict the use of this
kind of government information are referred to as housekeeping statutes.
3 4
Their purposes are: (1) to prevent direct exertion of judicial power over
executive personnel;35 (2) to preserve documents from loss, deterioration, or
alteration; (3) to remove the burden of constantly making records available
for inquiry; and (4) to prevent the disclosure of opinions, advice or other
sensitive information.
Reasons two and three do not seem to justify the government's remov-
ing information from judicial inquiry. With modern techniques, copies can
be made without damaging the original, and they can be made admissible
as evidence with like effect as the original.36 If only the report is privileged,
information or testimony is available from those who compiled the informa-
tion for the report or document. Possibly preliminary reports or depart-
mental notes also may be sources for obtaining the desired information.3 7
It is true that there is an additional burden on the agency in compiling and
maintaining records if copies must be made available or if employees must
testify or produce informal records. However, the burden of providing
The trial court was to balance the harm to the public interest caused by disclosure against
the public interest in permitting inspections. The court indicated that to prevent the
breach of a pledge of confidentiality, given to obtain information, would be a sufficient
public interest. Such disclosures would lead to public distrust. People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d
84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957) also indicates disclosure would not be compelled where the public
interest would be prejudiced. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2378 nn.7 & 8 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual Rule 442 (1963); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 391 § 1
(1953).
34 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2387 nn.7 & 8 A Critical Examination of Some Evidentiary
Privileges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L. Rev. 206, 283 (1961); Carrow, Governmental Non-
disclosure in Judicial Proceedings, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166 (1958).
35 Special privileges of the executive branch of government have been discussed in
prior sections.
36 Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 30, §§ 19, 28 & 30 (1967); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 73, § 1017 (1967); Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 95 1/2, § 2-107 (1967); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 120 § 613 (1967); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.
§ 7 (1967); 5 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1630-1684 (3d ed. 1940).
37 49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) reads in part: "No part of any report or reports of the Board
relating to any accident or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used
in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or
reports." The courts have reasoned that the report is privileged because the reports contain
opinions and conclusions for purposes of enacting safety legislation. It would be unfair
to allow such conclusions in evidence in civil suits because it would almost be impossible
to convince the trier of fact that these findings are not conclusive. But it is almost im-
possible for litigants to obtain information involving airplane accidents. For this reason
the courts have narrowly interpreted this privilege and the testimony of investigators can
be compelled. See, Lobel v. American Airlines Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951) (subcom-
mittee reports are also admissible if the portions which contain opinions and conclusion
are omitted because the statute only excludes the official Civil Aeronautics Board report).
Contra, Berguido v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963) (court felt that in-
vestigators would be unable to obtain information if the information given to them
would be available in civil litigation).
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information does not seem to be a sufficient justification to remove informa-
tion from judicial inquiry.3 8 It is not always easy to determine the legislative
purpose for enacting a particular housekeeping statute. But it would seem
that under the Illinois statutes it is the information, not just the report,
that is privileged.3 9
The Illinois legislature has apparently adopted reason four. The legis-
lature may feel that certain agencies can function better if their opinions and
work are kept confidential. This is probably a valid argument. The policy
of the legislature may have merit, but will the courts recognize legislative
policy at the expense of judicial ascertainment of the truth? In an early
Illinois case, the judiciary indicated it would give a narrow interpretation
to the housekeeping statutes. But the courts will recognize the intention of
the legislature where there is a clear expression that records are not to be
used in judicial proceedings.
40
Although the courts will recognize legislative policy, the courts may not
be bound to do so. Removal of government agency information from ju-
dicial review in the interest of public policy has been criticized. A few state
courts and at least one commentator feel the federal courts have impliedly
said they are not bound to recognize communications or records as priv-
ileged unless it is to preserve a recognized privilege.4 ' But the decision of
88 Marceau v. Orange Realty, Inc., 97 N.H. 497, 92 A.2d 656 (1952); Bowles v. Acher-
man, 4 F.R.D. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 640 (1967) provides "Except as is hereinafter provided in this
Section, information obtained from any individual or employing unit pursuant to the
administration of this Act shall be confidential and shall not be published or be open to
public inspection, nor be used in any court in any action or proceeding pending therein,
nor be admissible in evidence in any action or proceeding other than one arising out of
the provisions of this Act." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 102 (1967) provides: "Such information,
records, reports, statements, notes, memoranda or other data shall not be admissible as
evidence .... "
40 Compare Smith v. Illinois Valley Ice Cream Co., 20 Ill. App. 2d 312, 156 N.E.2d
361 (2d Dist. 1959) with Bell v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 327 Iln. App. 321, 64 N.E.2d
204 (1st Dist. 1945). In the first case, statements were privileged where statute specifically
excluded their use in court. In the second case, the court said records were not privileged
where there was not a specific prohibition against judicial inquiry. Accord, Marceau v.
Orange Realty Inc., 97 N.H. 497, 92 A.2d 656 (1952) (statutory privilege afforded records
of administrative agencies are to be strictly construed. The obligation to disclose informa-
tion should not be limited without a clear legislative mandate); In re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co.
of New York, 301 N.Y. 21, 92 N.E.2d 49 (1950) (where legislative intent is made clear,
records will not be available); Thomas v. Morris, 286 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E.2d 141 (1941),
(records are not privileged unless the intent is dearly expressed in the statute); In re
Fife's Estate, 164 Ohio St. 449, 132 N.E.2d 185 (1956) (income tax returns can be used at
trial where the only prohibition is against their being open to the public); Powers ex Tel.
Department of Employment Security v. Superior Court, 79 RI. 63, 82 A.2d 885 (1951)
(statute must specifically prohibit the use of records in court proceedings).
41 In Davis, Administrative Law Text (1959), the author argues that in United
States v. Reynolds, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951) the lower courts refused the recognize the
housekeeping privilege conferred by Congress. The Supreme Court, 345 U.S. I, 73 S. Ct.
528 (1953), did not disapprove of the lower court's attitude, but found the claim of privilege
could be upheld by invoking the recognized state secret privilege. Professor Davis feels
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the federal courts may not accurately reflect the attitude of the state courts.
The state courts are generally dealing with specific statutes which prohibit
the use of information. The statutes reflect the legislative policy on a par-
ticular subject. By comparison, on the federal level, the administrative
agencies promulgate rules for the exclusion of certain information, and
Congress seldom considers the reasons, or lack of them, for removing this
information from judicial inquiry.42
There is a second reason why the state courts may not follow the deci-
sions of the federal courts. The magnitude of the problems created in up-
holding housekeeping statutes is not the same on the state level. The federal
government often possesses information which is unavailable from any other
source. Thus, for the courts to uphold the validity of housekeeping statutes
would be to deprive a private litigant of evidence necessary to prove his
case. 48 On the state level, the balance of interest between the public good as
determined by the legislature and the harm to the individual by not having
information available from governmental sources is tipped in favor of up-
holding the grant of privilege. The state courts are not likely to overturn
legislative policy where the litigant is generally able to obtain the evidence
from other sources to support his case. At this time, the courts of most states
seem committed to recognize the authority of the legislature in this area. 44
their failure to overturn the lower court's decision on this point with three justices dis-
senting in favor of upholding the decision of the lower court implies the courts need
not recognize Congressional directives. (Writers comment: It could be argued that the
silence of the majority indicates nothing more than the attitude of the Supreme Court to
avoid controversial issues when another solution is possible.) The same conclusion was
reached by a Nevada court in Elson v. Bowen, 83 Nev. 515, 436 P.2d 12 (1967). The court
said the Reynolds case has determined that the courts can review executive action. A
claim of executive privilege or department order pursuant to Congressional authority will
not prevent disclosure where the judiciary finds no public interest to be protected. See In re
Story, 159 Ohio St. 144, 111 N.E.2d 385 (1953); Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal
Courts, 71, Yale L.J. 879 (1962).
42 In 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2378 n.17 (McNaughton rev. 1961), Professor Wigmore
distinguishes between rules promulgated by administrative agencies under legislative
authority and specific statutes enacted by the legislature. Agency rules are subject to abuse
to prevent embarassing material from being disclosed without furthering social policy.
The federal housekeeping rules are promulgated by agencies whereas the state statutes
involved are specific and are more likely to reflect sound social policy.
In In re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co. of New York, supra note 40, the dissenting opinion did
not question the legislative power to enact statutes removing information from judicial
inquiry. The opinion only questioned the city's exercise of delegated power from the legis-
lature to make records privileged.
43 See note 37 supra; United States v. Reynolds, supra note 41; Hardin, supra note 41.
44 Generally, state courts have not questioned the right of the legislature to remove
information from judicial inquiry and only quibble over the wording necessary to achieve
this end. See note 40 supra. But a few courts have not completely yielded to legislative
authority. For example, in Marceau v. Orange Realty Inc., supra note 40, the court rec-
ognized the legislative desire to remove information from judicial inquiry, but the court
left the door open to examine the validity of the purpose for withholding information
from judicial inquiry. New York originally indicated that the courts could evaluate the
legislative objective for preventing exposure of certain information. Andrews v. Cacchio,
264 App. Div. 791, 35 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1942). But the New York courts have apparently
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Because housekeeping statutes are usually designed to assist the govern-
ment in carrying out its functions, the privilege is for the benefit of the gov-
ernment. When the privilege can be waived at all, waiver is at the discretion
of the governmental body.45 But at times information which the govern-
ment possesses is given statutory protection for the benefit of the individual.
The Protection of Records section of the Illinois Public Aid Code is appar-
ently in this category.46 Like the informer privilege, the government may
find it necessary to protect the individual to obtain information. The agency
is probably able to function more efficiently with a full and frank disclosure
of information. And the statute apparently confers a personal privilege to
enable the agency to acquire a full disclosure of delicate information. But
unlike the informer privilege, which is to protect the interests of govern-
ment, this statute protects the individual. As a result, it appears the judi-
ciary may compel the disclosure of information where it feels the need
exists.4 7 This is contrary to the "true" housekeeping statute where the legis-
lature or executive officer determines when the need for disclosure exists.
REQUIRED REPORT STATUTES
Required report statutes serve a function similar to the informer priv-
ilege.4 8 The government is willing to protect the individual who makes the
abandoned this attitude. In In re Bakers Mut. Ins. Co. of New York, supra note 40 the
court said the reason for granting a privilege to certain information is a legislative ques-
tion. They have jurisdiction over these decisions and their decisions should not be re-
agitated by the courts.
45 Maxwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 343 P.2d 769 (1959) (if a privilege is for
the benefit of the state to protect the public interest, then a subordinate official may not
waive the privilege); Scott v. District of Columbia, 122 A.2d 579 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1956)
(treasury regulation prohibiting the disclosure of official information was for the benefit
of the government, and Internal Revenue agents could disclose admissions in a Columbia
sales tax case over the objection of defendant).
46 For the protection of applicants and recipients, the Illinois Department, the
county departments and local governmental units and their respective officers and
employees are prohibited, except as hereinafter provided, from disclosing the
contents of any records, files, papers and communications, except for purposes
directly connected with the administration of public aid under this Code.
In any judicial proceeding, except a proceeding directly concerned with the
administration of programs provided for in this Code, or in which the applicant or
recipient is a party thereto, such records, files, papers and communications, and
their contents shall be deemed privileged communications.
The Illinois Department shall establish and enforce reasonable rules and reg-
ulations governing the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers, files
and communications of the Illinois Department, the county departments and local
governmental units receiving State or Federal funds or aid. The governing body
of other local governmental units shall in like manner establish and enforce rules
and regulations governing the same matters.
The contents of case files pertaining to recipients under Articles VI and VII
shall be made available without subpoena or formal notice to the officers of any
court, to all law enforcing agencies, and to such other persons or agencies as from
time to time may be authorized by any court.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, § 11-9 (1967).
47 Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual Rule 442 (1963).
48 Goodman v. Gonse, 247 Iowa 1091, 76 N.W.2d 873 (1956) (the accident report priv
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report in order to acquire information. To promote a full and accurate dis-
closure of possibly incriminating information the government makes the
report privileged. However, the degree of protection the privilege may afford
will vary depending on the nature of the information sought and the con-
struction a court will give to the particular statutory wording.
There are many possible types of required report statutes. Common
among these are Selective Service reports, income tax returns and health
reports to promote the disclosure and treatment of social diseases. 49 Of the
numerous required report statutes, the most common on the state level is
probably the required accident report statute. The Illinois required report
statute is selected as an example of the government's willingness to obtain
information at the price of confidentiality.
To acquire information for highway safety Illinois has made required
accident reports privileged. 5° Chapter 95/2 section 14251 provides that the
Department of Public Works and Buildings shall use these reports to pro-
vide statistical information on the number and causes of traffic accidents.
Copies of the reports or information derived from them can also be fur-
nished to the Secretary of State for his confidential use. To acquire this
information section 14152 provides that these accident reports shall be con-
fidential. It now becomes necessary to determine what information the state
wants and what protection it is willing to give in return.
To determine what information the state desires it may be helpful to
consider an early Iowa accident report statute. The statute read: "All acci-
dent reports . . . shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting
and shall be for the confidential use of the department .... "5 The courts
gave a liberal construction to this section and all accident reports, including
police reports, were found to be within the protection of the statute. If the
ilege is in the nature of an immunity granted in return for information requested by the
state); See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2377 n.8 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
49 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2377 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
50 (a) All required accident reports and supplemental reports shall be without prej-
udice to the individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the
department except that the department may disclose the identity of a person in-
volved in an accident when such identity is not otherwise known or when such
person denies his presence at such accident. No such report shall be used as evi-
dence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the
department shall furnish upon demand of any person who has, or claims to have
made such a report, or upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that a
specified accident report has or has not been made to the department solely to
prove a compliance or a failure to comply with the requirement that such a report
be made to the department.
(b) The department may furnish to the Secretary of State copies of required acci-
dent reports or information taken from such reports. All such copies of reports or
information taken from them shall be for the confidential use of the Secretary of
State.
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 V2, § 141 (1967).
51 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 V, § 142 (1967).
52 See note 50 supra.
53 I.C.A. § 321.271 (1966fi).
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report was privileged, statements and information acquired by a police
officer at the scene of the accident would be privileged if they were obtained
to make his report. To give effect to the privilege the officer and third
parties who overheard the reporter were necessarily prohibited from testi-
fying.54 Subsequent experience showed, however, that in civil suits evidence
was difficult to obtain. 55 The legislature repealed this statute and enacted
another statute in 1967.56 Now only accident reports which are required by
the motor vehicle department are privileged and police reports are available
upon request for a fee of one dollar.
Turning to Illinois, the information the state desires is stated in section
141: "All required accident reports ...shall be without prejudice to the
individual so reporting and shall be for the confidential use of the depart-
ment .... ,57 Unless an incorporated city enacts a required report ordinance,
which is also within the protection of section 141,58 there is only one re-
quired report. This is the report filed with the Department of Public Works
and Buildings. Therefore, an accident report made by a law enforcement
officer is not a required report which will be considered confidential. 59 If the
report is not confidential, then information which the officer obtains either
at the accident scene or later by way of observation or voluntary disclosures
is not privileged.60 Similarly, a driver must give immediate notice of an
accident if there is death or injury to any person or property damage in
excess of one hundred dollars. This is not a required report, but is only a
requirement to give notice of an accident; and statements made while giving
notice of an accident are not within the privilege.
Only the written report is privileged. If the person who is to make the
required report dictates information while another fills out the report, the
person receiving the information may be required to testify to the informa-
tion he received. 61 In the usual situation, this is not a harsh result. The per-
54 Pickney v. Watkinson, 254 Iowa 144, 116 N.W.2d 258 (1962).
55 The problems created by making all reports, and information received in making
the report, privileged are numerous. For examples see Decennial Digests, Witnesses, Key
Number 216 and note the decisions of Delaware, Florida and Iowa.
56 I.C.A. § 321.271 (1966).
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 /, § 141 (1967). For the complete statutory provision see
note 50 supra.
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 1/, § 143 (1967).
59 Gidlof v. Grosser, 335 Ill. App. 124, 80 N.E.2d 283 (lst Dist. 1948); Paliokaitis v.
Checker Taxi Co., 324 Ill. App. 21, 57 N.E.2d 216 (1st Dist. 1944) (police reports may still
be inadmissible, however, if they contain hearsay on hearsay statements or the officer's
opinions and conclusions).
60 Carroll v. Beavers, 126 Cal. App. 2d 828, 275 P.2d 56 (1954); Jaxon v. City of
Detroit, 379 Mo. 405, 151 N.W2d 813 (1967).
61 In Ritter v. Nieman, 329 Ill. App. 163, 67 N.E.2d 417 (1st Dist. 1946). Although
the court found a report was inadmissible it is less than clear whose report was inad-
missible and for what reasons. But statements made to the sheriff while the sheriff filled
out this report were not privileged. This case is cited as supporting the position that only
the report is privileged in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2377 n.8 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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son required to make the report is given ten days after the accident to file
his report. Typically, this report is completed well after the accident when
all parties are over the initial shock and in a state of relative calm. The
forms are obtained at a police department, completed, and returned without
any more conversation than is necessary to convey the request for a form.
But there are situations where a person with an education or language bar-
rier may seek the assistance of a second party who may be a law enforcement
officer. The second party may be compelled to testify to admissions he re-
ceived against the reporter's interest. The Illinois statute does not provide
a solution for this situation.6 2 No cases can be found exactly in point. In the
California case of Carroll v. Beavers,6 a driver who later died of injuries
sustained in the accident, was in the hospital and possibly of necessity
dictated information to a police officer who completed the driver's written
report. On rehearing,64 the court reversed itself and found only the written
report was privileged and statements made to the officer were not.
The court's construction that only the written report is privileged ap-
pears harsh in some circumstances. Although the statute could be applied
with flexibility in cases of necessity, a panacea is not found in a too liberal
attitude. Iowa's experience teaches us that there must be a balance between
the legislative policy to obtain information and the necessity to keep infor-
mation available for judicial inquiry.
After deciding what disclosures the statute will protect as an exchange
for needed information, it now becomes necessary to determine the degree
of protection afforded. The pertinent portion of the statute provides:
All required accident reports and supplemental reports shall be
without prejudice to the individual so reporting and shall be for
the confidential use of the department .... No such report shall
be used in any trial, civil or criminal ....
First, the protection extends to both civil and criminal trials. The
statutes of some states do not specifically exclude the use of the report in
62 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 95 ,/2, §§ 138 & 139 (1967). Provision is made for other persons
to make the required report in case of physical disability but the person must have been
either another occupant of the vehicle or the owner of the vehicle.
Writer's comment: The case of Ritter v. Nieman, supra note 61, was a peculiar case
and its scope could be limited to the facts of the case. The sheriff apparently had a re-
quired report form in his possession and helped the driver fill out his report at the scene
of the accident. The usual procedure is for the driver to obtain a required report form
at a police station and file the report within ten days after the accident. The entire trans-
action takes place away from the scene of the accident. If the information obtained in
Ritter was found privileged, the court would have condoned a procedure which would
make police reports privileged contrary to the terms of the statute. The police officer
would obtain the information and complete both the police report and the accident re-
port. To protect the reporting party and keep the information he gave confidential would
require both reports to become privileged. Where a person is at a police station or else-
where and seeks advice, the policy considerations in Ritter are absent.
63 126 Cal. App. 2d 828, 273 P.2d 56 (1954).
64 The first decision is reported in 270 P2d 23 (1954).
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criminal trials, and the courts have construed this omission to mean the
required report can be used as evidence in criminal trials.
6 5
Second, the wording of the statute may create more than a personal
privilege, which the reporter would have to claim, and it may be the report
is entirely incompetent as evidence. The statute says the "report shall not
be used in any trial," and sections 141 and 142 list the permitted uses of
the reports. If the report were used at trial, it may be reversible error. This
conclusion would be justified if the court found the statute was for the
benefit of the public and the reporter only received an incidental benefit.66
As a statute for the benefit of the people, it does not appear anyone is given
authority to waive the public interest.
Even if the statute's protection is personal in nature, the presence of the
report may still be the basis for reversible error. If the report found its way
into the trial at the objection of the reporter, it is difficult to imagine a
situation where there would be no prejudice. However, if the statute is only
to protect the individual, then it would appear the reporter should be able
to waive this protection as he can waive all other privileges which are for
his protection. 67
The possibly absolute restriction on the use of required reports should
not be a serious objection. While the document itself is privileged, no other
information is removed from judicial inquiry. And any information derived
from collateral sources is available as evidence. It cannot be seriously con-
tended that the privilege removes information from judicial inquiry which
would otherwise be available. Without the privilege, how many individuals
would disclose information which would subject them to possible civil or
criminal liability just to give the state valuable accident information?
CONCLUSION
The government has a wide range of possible privileges it may assert to
remove information from judicial inquiry. In each case, the courts must
65 State v. Flack, 25 Iowa 529, 101 N.W.2d 535 (1960).
66 Herbert v. Garner, 78 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1955) (statute provided the report shall not be
used in evidence. To allow one who overheard the making of the report to establish its
contents would avoid the purpose of the statute); Sprague v. Brodus, 245 Iowa 90, 60
N.W.2d 850 (1954) (statutory words for exclusion of reports as evidence similar to Illinois
except police reports are also privileged. Statute is for the benefit of the public and
is not a personal privilege which may be waived. Use of police report was reversible error);
Lee v. Artis, 136 S.E.2d 868 (Va. 1964) (case reversed because of accident report and other
errors).
67 Carroll v. Beavers, supra note 63 (a required report found its way into court, but
an objection to its use was sustained. In construing a statute similar to that of Illinois,
the court said, the presence of the report "was a betrayal of the confidence which the State
required its maker to repose in the State's agencies." The report, if used, would probably
have been reversible error); Rosenfeld v. Johnson, 161 So. 2d 703 (Fla. App. 1964) (con-
fidential report does not exclude statements which, if otherwise admissible, are favorable
to the reporting party); Williams v. Scott, 15 So, %4 18 (Fla. App. 1963) (use of confidential
accident report is not reversible error).
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look at the nature of the information being withheld and the purpose which
motivates the government to make a claim of privilege. The problem may
be complicated by the availability of more than one reason to prevent dis-
closure.
The court must look at the interest of government to be protected and
compare this with the need of the individual to obtain information. The
weight to be given each conflicting position will necessarily vary from state
to state and with the composition of the courts within a state. At this time,
the Illinois courts seem to be favorable to the interests of government.
ROBERT W. WEBB
